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ABSTRACT
In this work, we consider challenges relating to security for Indus-
trial Control Systems (ICS) in the context of ICS security education
and research targeted both to academia and industry. We propose
to address those challenges through gamified attack training and
countermeasure evaluation.
We tested our proposed ICS security gamification idea in the
context of the (to the best of our knowledge) first Capture-The-Flag
(CTF) event targeted to ICS security called SWaT Security Show-
down (S3). Six teams acted as attackers in a security competition
leveraging an ICS testbed, with several academic defense systems
attempting to detect the ongoing attacks. The event was conducted
in two phases. The online phase (a jeopardy-style CTF) served as a
training session. The live phase was structured as an attack-defense
CTF. We acted as judges and we assigned points to the attacker
teams according to a scoring system that we developed internally
based on multiple factors, including realistic attacker models. We
conclude the paper with an evaluation and discussion of the S3, in-
cluding statistics derived from the data collected in each phase of
S3.
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control System (ICS) security is a major challenge be-
cause it requires specific knowledge about domain-specific devices,
industrial protocols and general knowledge about traditional IT se-
curity threats [24, 36, 39]. A common trend in ICS is the shift to-
wards commodity computing platforms and communication chan-
nels, e.g., TCP/IP based communication using Ethernet instead of
RS-485 [18]. That shift if motivated by increased functionality,
together with cost savings. In addition, even smaller devices are
increasingly connected to networks (e. g., as part of the Industry
4.0 paradigm [34]), and use access to the Internet to report data or
obtain updates.
Recently, it has been widely argued that one of the fundamen-
tal issues in securing ICS lies in the cultural differences between
traditional IT security and ICS engineering [26, 35]. Therefore,
education has been advocated as a means of bridging the gap be-
tween these cultures [25,26]. However, recent surveys indicate that
although general IT security education efforts have risen in ICS,
there is still need for more targeted education combining both se-
curity and ICS specific knowledge [19].
ICS testbeds constitute a convenient environment to study ICS
security, however their deployment is rare because of many rea-
sons, such as cost and manpower [10, 41]. Researchers are usually
not able to get access to such testbeds, and those willing to do re-
search on ICS security are facing many problems, such as lack of
understanding of a real ICS and the inability to test (new) attacks
and countermeasures in a realistic setup. Another common issue in
ICS security is resulting from the intrinsic inter-disciplinary nature
of the subject, namely it is difficult to bring together people from
different expertise domains, such as control theory, information se-
curity, and engineering.
In this work, we propose a number of solutions to those prob-
lems, and we elaborate one of them based on gamification in the
context of ICS security education and research targeted both to
academia and industry. We strongly believe that gamification com-
bined with access to real and simulated ICS is a key driver for ICS
security progress at all levels (from beginner to expert) and among
different professional communities (both academia and industry).
We implemented our ideas as part of the (to the best of our
knowledge) first Capture-The-Flag style event on a productive In-
dustrial Control System held at our institution in the summer of
2016. The experiment leveraged a realistic water treatment testbed
that is available for security research [3], together with a simulation
environment for some of the proposed challenges.
Our experiment involved six attacker teams from academia and
industry worldwide. Attackers were provided with the documenta-
tion of the target systems, and the CTF composed of two phases:
an online qualifier and a live-phase. During the online phase the
attackers were exposed to simulations and remote-access to a phys-
ical water treatment plant. On the live-phase of the experiment,
teams deployed a wider range of attacks during two days, with
two academic attack detection systems in place. In this work we
describe the setup in detail, and comment on insights and lessons
learned.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We identify several issues that currently hinder the adoption
of security in industrial control systems, and likewise prevent
security researchers from becoming familiar with ICS.
• We propose a set of solutions to mitigate those issues, with
a particular focus on gamified interactive Capture-The-Flag
events using simulated and real infrastructure.
• We present the design and implementation of a two-part CTF
event in detail, and analyze its results.
This work organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide brief
background on Industrial Control Systems (ICS), the Secure Wa-
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ter Treatment, and Capture-The-Flag (CTF) events. In Section 3,
we present our problem statement and solution ideas. One of those
proposed ideas was implemented by us in two phases, which are
presented in detail in Section 4 and Section 5. We present an anal-
ysis of the two events together with lessons learned in Section 6.
Related work is summarized in Section 7, and we conclude the pa-
per in Section 8.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will introduce the relevant information about
Industrial Control Systems (ICS), the Secure Water Treatment a
real water treatment testbed and Capture-The-Flag (CTF) events.
2.1 Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are complex autonomous sys-
tems involving different types of interconnected devices and an un-
derlying physical process. ICS are deployed to monitor and control
different types of industrial processes, such as critical infrastruc-
ture (water distribution and treatment), and transportation systems
(planes and railways).
It is useful to categorize ICS devices according to their main
role in an ICS. Control devices, such as Programmable Logic Con-
trollers (PLC), and Human-Machine Interface (HMI), provides mon-
itoring and programmable control capabilities to the ICS. Network
devices, such as industrial switches and firewalls, provide the foun-
dations to build a (complex) ICS network that may include differ-
ent segments, protocols, and topologies. Typically, the ICS control
network is (virtually) separated from other networks such as DMZ,
and office networks. Physical-process devices, such as sensors and
actuators, directly interface with the underlying physical process
producing analog and digital signals that will be eventually con-
verted and processed by other devices. Furthermore, an ICS might
be viewed as a combination of OT (Operational Technology) and
IT (Information Technology) devices, indeed it requires different
expertises to be managed.
ICS security is a major challenge for many reasons. The com-
plexity and diversity of devices involved in an ICS increases the
attacker surface, namely an attacker can attack both the cyber-part
and the physical-part of an ICS. Additionally, modern ICS are
embracing standard Internet communication technologies, such as
TCP/IP based industrial protocol, resulting in ICS that can be con-
trolled (and attacked) from the Internet. Finally, the software of ICS
devices may contain vulnerabilities for several common reasons,
such as: un-patched or impossible to patch legacy code, the ab-
sence of standard security certifications for ICS devices, and lack of
resources to keep the ICS updated. We note that ICS often run pro-
prietary licensed Operating Systems, firmware, and management
software.
Arguably, threats to ICS focus on impact to the physical world,
instead of attacks on confidentiality or integrity of information. As
such, the damage by such attacks is expected to cause financial
cost due to destroyed property and decreased operational availabil-
ity of commercial systems. Famous examples of attacks on ICS are
Stuxnet [17] and the attack on a wastewater treatment facility in
Maroochy [37].
2.2 Secure Water Treatment
In this work, we leverage the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT)
for experimental work. SWaT is a state-of-the-art water treatment
testbed opened at our institution in 2015 that comprises six stages
or subsystems:
1. Supply and Storage pumps raw water from the source to the
Raw water tank.
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Figure 1: The SWaT architecture.
2. Pre-treatment chemically treats raw water controlling elec-
trical conductivity and pH.
3. Ultrafiltration (UF) and backwash purifies water using ul-
trafiltration membranes, collects ultra-filtrated water in the
Ultra-filtration tank, and periodically cleans the UF mem-
branes.
4. De-Chlorination chemically and/or physically (UV light)
removes chlorine from ultra-filtrated water.
5. Reverse Osmosis (RO) purifies water using RO process, sep-
arates the result into permeate (purified) and concentrate (dirty)
water.
6. Permeate transfer and storage store permeate water into
the RO permeate tank.
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the SWaT. Starting from
the bottom we can see six gray boxes representing the six water
treatment stages. Each stage involves two PLCs, configured in re-
dundant mode, a Remote Input-Output (RIO) device, that trans-
lates analog and digital signals, and a set of sensors and actuators.
Each stage’s network is labeled as L0 (Layer 0), and it is an Eth-
ernet ring topology built using the Device Level Ring (DLR) pro-
tocol. Every PLC is connected to the L1 (Layer 1) network us-
ing a conventional star topology, a SCADA server, an HMI and a
Historian server. Other network segments access the SWaT con-
trol network through an industrial firewall, such as DMZ devices
and internet connected devices. The spoken industrial protocol is
Ethernet/IP, that is an implementation of the Common Industrial
Protocol (CIP) [28] based on the TCP/IP protocol stack.
SWaT is specified to process at least 5 US gallons/min of perme-
ate (purified) water, permeate water with pH from 6 to 7 and electri-
cal conductivity of at least 10 µS/cm, less than 50% concentrated
(dirty) water recirculation, and recover at least 70% processed (to-
tal) water.
2.3 Capture-The-Flag (CTF) events
Capture-The-Flag (CTF) are cyber-security contests organized
worldwide by Universities, private companies and non-profit or-
ganizations. CTF events can be classified as: jeopardy-style or
attack-defense. A jeopardy-style CTF usually is hosted online and
involves a set of tasks to be solved divided by categories, such as
cryptography and reverse engineering. Each task is presented with
a description, a number of hints and an amount of reward points.
The solution of a challenge involves finding (or computing) a mes-
sage (the flag) with a prescribed format, such as CTF{my_flag},
and submitting it to the CTF scoring system. An attack-defense
CTF, also called Red (attacker) team/Blue (defender) team, is orga-
nized both offline and online where each team is given an iden-
tical virtual machine containing some vulnerable services. The
teams are connected on the same LAN, and their goal is both to
have a high service runtime and to penetrate the services of the
other teams, e. g., finding and exploiting a vulnerable service has
two benefits: it allows a team to patch a service to be more re-
silient against adversarial attacks, and to attack other teams vul-
nerable service. Both jeopardy-style and attack-defense, CTF have
time constraints (realistic scenario) and the team who scores most
points wins the competition. The presented paper uses both online
jeopardy-style and live attack-defense CTF styles to augment the
learning experience.
Such events attract the attention of both industrial and academic
teams and currently enjoy increasing popularity, as indicated by an
established website in this community, listing CTF competitions
worldwide [13]: this website lists 100 events being held worldwide,
some of them with a long tradition such as the hacker-oriented DE-
FCON CTF [14] and the academic-oriented iCTF [11]. Of the
10,000 teams listed in CTF time in 2016, some are academic and
others are composed of a heterogeneous mixture of security enthu-
siasts, many of them security professionals.
CTF-like gamified security competitions are expected to help
the ICS security community in many ways [15, 30, 40]. A CTF
is an hands-on learning experience and it can be used as an ed-
ucational tool, research tool, and as an assessment tool. Ideally,
both recruiters and candidates from academia and industry bene-
fit participating in CTF events as they exercise key aspects of the
ICS security domain such as knowledge of security (recent) threats,
teamwork, analytical thinking, development of (new) skills, and
working in a constrained environment. The gamification aspect of a
CTF allows the participant to express his or her full potential, e. g.,
attack/defend without fear of consequences or bad marks. CTF
events have already been proposed as a means to enhance security
education and awareness [15,30,40]. Although such events cover a
wide range of security domains, to the best of our knowledge they
do not include so far the security of ICS.
3. GAMIFYING EDUCATION AND
RESEARCH ON ICS SECURITY
We start this section by summarizing current challenge state-
ments from academia and industry, and we leverage them to set
the problem statement of this work. Then, we propose number of
solution approaches. We focus on one of them, and discuss how it
could be implemented.
3.1 ICS Current Security Challenges
In recent years, experts have argued extensively about the crit-
icality of securing Industrial Control Systems (ICS)s. Many have
pointed out that one fundamental challenge in achieving this task
lies in cultural and educational differences between the fields of
(traditional) information security and ICS security. According to
Schoenmakers [35]: “Differences in perspectives between IT and
OT specialists can cause security issues for control systems. It is
important for organizations to keep in mind that different values be-
tween groups can influence the perception of issues and solutions.”,
which emphasizes the cultural clashes still existing between tradi-
tional IT security and ICS specialists.
Education and training have been advocated to bridge this gap,
but there still work to do in this domain. Luijif [25] describes the
security of ICS as a societal challenge, and recommends:“Many of
these challenges have to be overcome by both end-users, system
integrators and ICS manufacturers at the long run: (. . . ) proper
education and workforce development”.
Despite the problem of education being widely acknowledged,
according to a recent report published by SANS Institute [19]: “It
is clear from our results that most of our respondents hold security
certifications, but the largest number of these (52%) is not specific
to control systems (. . . ) IT security education is valuable, particu-
larly with the converging technology trends, but it does not trans-
late directly to ICS environments.”
In order to effectively improve the security of ICS it is thus cru-
cial to educate researchers and practitioners such that they are able
to understand the subtleties and domain-specific requirements and
constraints of security and ICS. As recently pointed out by Luijif
in [26]: “(. . . ) ICS and (office) IT have historically been man-
aged by separate organizational units. ICS people do not consider
their ICS to be IT. ICS are just monitoring and control functions
integrated into the process being operated. ICS people lack cy-
ber security education. The IT department, on the other hand, is
unfamiliar with the peculiarities and limitations of ICS technology.
They do not regard the control of processes to have any relationship
with IT. Only a few people have the knowledge and experience to
bridge both domains and define an integrated security approach.
Organizations that have brought the personnel from these two di-
verse domains together have successfully bridged the gap and im-
proved the mutual understanding of both their IT and ICS domains.
Their security posture has risen considerably.”
3.2 Problem Statement
With the challenges from Section 3.1 as a high-level goal in
mind, in the following we discuss the problem statement and the
proposed solutions.
Based on the literature and our experience, we think that tradi-
tional IT (security) professionals need more information about the
following topics:
• Common device classes, network topologies, and protocols
used in ICS.
• Design methodologies best-practices and operational objec-
tives in ICS.
• Physical processes specifications.
• Control theory models.
Furthermore, training for ICS (security) professionals can be ben-
eficial in the areas of:
• Common “modern” Internet communication technologies (Eth-
ernet, IP, TCP, UDP, NAT).
• Common security challenges and standard solutions (MitM
attacks, TLS, firmware and software update schedules).
• Standardization and specifications related to security prod-
ucts.
Problem statement How can we create an impactful educational
experience that addresses the aforementioned gaps?
3.3 Proposed Solution Approaches
We now propose a number of approaches to alleviate the outlined
problems. We then present a solution that covers several of the
proposed approaches.
1. A set of common use cases for ICS. In particular, the use
cases would include a fictional or real physical process and
details on the communication network topology.
2. Interactive ICS testbeds, that allow users to familiarize them-
selves with the control devices and protocols used and inter-
act with the underlying physical process.
3. Practical training on ICS and information security.
4. Testing of security solutions through external parties, and
standard certifications.
3.4 The SWaT Security Showdown
In this work, we focus on the aspect of training and validation of
applied security skills for industry professionals and researchers.
Gamification in education has been advocated as a means to en-
rich the learning experience [22]. In particular, within IT security,
the implementation of CTF-like competitions have been argued to
be advantageous for education and training [40]. Inspired by the
gamified nature of CTF, we propose the following approach.
Our goal is to create a realistic environment where participants
are encouraged to think out of the box. In real-life ICS settings,
several intrusion detection mechanisms are in place to safe-guard
critical operations. A successful attacker would have to bypass
such systems in order to pose a threat, and simulating such set-
tings would stimulate a participant’s ingenuity to attempt creative
attacks. On the other hand, if successful, such attacks will po-
tentially unveil limitations of the defense mechanism. Therefore,
we propose to divide participants in a training event into two cate-
gories: participants interested in developing defenses for ICS (de-
fenders) and participants interested in testing the security of ICS
(attackers).
In order to get the most out of an interaction with a real ICS
testbed, it is important to learn fundamental concepts of ICS se-
curity. However, this learning phase should be as hands-on and
gamified as possible. To this extent, we propose an on-line train-
ing phase, where attackers get familiar with ICS concepts and a
particular critical infrastructure by means of a jeopardy-style CTF.
Different from traditional CTFs, the challenges are tailored to high-
light ICS concepts and use realistic simulations of ICS networks
and remote interaction with ICS hardware. In this phase, attackers
also should be aware of the internal workings of common defense
mechanisms in place, and documentations there-of are shared with
them.
After this preparation, in a live phase attackers phase interaction
with a live system that is being monitored by defenders. In this
setting, attackers should have concrete goals to achieve (or flags in
CTF jargon), and their scoring should be influenced by the num-
ber of defenses triggered during their attack. In order to motivate
attackers to perform more creative and difficult attacks, different at-
tacker models can be suggested to them (i.e. insiders with adminis-
tration capabilities, outsiders with network access) and the scoring
can be adjusted according to the attacker model chosen.
Finally, participants will have access to statistics on their perfor-
mance based on a unified scoring system taking into account both
phases. Attackers will benefit from this experience since in order
to solve the on-line and live challenges they will have to go through
several of the topics discussed in the previous subsection. On the
other hand, defenders will benefit by putting their solutions to the
test against creative attackers.
We have implemented the proposed concepts at our institution
in 2016, under the name SWaT Security Showdown. In the fol-
lowing two sections, we present the two main phases of that event,
which represent the two target systems we introduced earlier: a)
online challenges using questions and simulated systems, and b)
live events using a real physical ICS. Due to organizational con-
straints, and in order to maximize the learning experience, we de-
cided to limit the participants to SWaT Security Showdown to se-
lected invited teams from academia and industry, both for attacker
and defender roles, for a total of 12 invited teams (6 attackers, 6 de-
fenders, of which 3 academic and 3 industrial teams respectively).
Teams were not limited in size, but only a maximum of 4 mem-
bers could participate physically in the live event whereas remain-
ing team members could join remotely.
4. ONLINE PHASE OF S3
In this section we will present the SWaT Security Showdown on-
line event, and the details about its setup, and presented challenges.
We will describe more in detail three set of challenges from the
MiniCPS, Trivia and Forensics categories. We conclude the sec-
tion with a summary of the collected results.
4.1 Online phase Setup and Challenges
The SWaT Security Showdown online phase involved six teams
of attackers, three from industry, and three from academia. We
presented a total of twenty challenges in preparation for this phase,
and we offered to each team a limited time to access to Secure
Water Treatment, and the required documentation to get familiar
with the SWaT and Ethernet/IP. We organized two sessions, each
one 48 hours long, where three teams at a time attempted to solve
the challenges for a total amount of 510 points.
The S3 online phase was structured as a jeopardy-style CTF, and
did not require physical access to the SWaT. The main goal of this
phase was to provide an adequate training to the attacker teams
(third goal from Section 3.3). Please refer to Section 2.3 for more
information about Capture-The-Flag events.
Table 1 summarizes the proposed tasks. We presented twenty
tasks divided into five categories: MiniCPS, Trivia, Forensics, PLC,
and Misc, for a total of 510 points. Each category exercised several
ICS security domains, such as Denial-of-Service, and Main-in-the-
Middle attacks. It is important to notice that categories such as
MiniCPS, Trivia, and PLC are novel in the domain of traditional
jeopardy-style CTFs. Following CTF design best-practices we pre-
sented the challenges of each category in increasing order of dif-
ficulty e. g.,: solving challenge x helped to solve challenge x+ 1,
and when necessary, we gave hints e. g.,: you could use toolx to
accomplish a certain task. In general, we used the online event as a
training session to prepare the attacker teams for the S3 live event
that is described in Section 5.
Table 1: SWaT Security Showdown Online challenges sum-
mary: 20 tasks, worth 510 points.
Category Tasks Points Security Domains
MiniCPS 5 210 network mapping, DoS,
reconnaissance, MitM
attacks in ENIP,
tampering, tank overflow
Trivia 6 45 SWaT’s physical process,
devices and attacks
Forensics 4 105 packet inspection,
processing and
cryptography
PLC 3 60 ladder logic, code audit
and development
Misc 2 90 web authentication,
steganography
We built a Webapp to run the S3 scoring system using the flask
Python framework [32] (Figure 2 shows S3 online challenges’ web
page). The web pages were served over HTTPS, using Let’s En-
crypt [20], and a basic brute-force attempts detection mechanism
based on user input logging was put in place on the backend side.
A dedicated web page was showing a live chart with the scores from
all the teams. We offered live help with two different channels: an
IRC channel on freenode.org, and via email. The following is
an example of user interface interaction with our Webapp: member
of team A logs in to S3’s Webapp (using the provided credentials),
she navigates to challenge X’s Web page, then enters the flag on an
HTML form. If the flag is correct, she receives N reward points,
Figure 2: S3 online challenges’ web page.
otherwise a submission error appears on screen.
In the following, we focus on the tasks related to MiniCPS, Trivia,
and Forensics categories, since they better illustrate the novel na-
ture of the challenges proposed, and then we will present a sum-
mary of the results from the online event.
4.2 MiniCPS Category
The online phase presented five challenges in the MiniCPS cat-
egory. MiniCPS is a toolkit for Cyber-Physical System security
research [8]. MiniCPS was used to “realistically” reproduce (sim-
ulate) part of the Secure Water Treatment, including the hydraulic
physical process, the devices and the network. Each simulated in-
stance accessed by the attackers’ teams was running on Amazon
Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud (AWS EC2), using an m3-
type virtual machine (one instance per team).
Figure 3 shows the simulation setup of a single instance, that was
replicated for all the six teams. Each attacking team was provided
with the credential to access an SSH server running on a simu-
lated chrooted gateway device. The attacker had access to the emu-
lated virtual control network that used the same topology, addresses
(IP, MAC, net masks), and industrial protocol (Ethernet/IP), of the
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Figure 3: MiniCPS-based setup for online challenges.
SWaT.
The attacker could interact with other simulated SWaT’s devices
in the star topology (four PLCs and an HMI), and alter the state of
the simulated water treatment process affecting the two simulated
water tanks (the Raw water tank and the Ultra-filtration tank). For
example, an attacker might send a packet containing a false water
level sensor reading of the Ultra-filtration tank to the HMI, or a
packet that tells to PLC2 to switch off the motorized valve, that
controls how much water goes into the Raw water tank. As a side
note, Figure 3’s setup is part of an internal project involving the
development of novel honeypots for ICS [7].
The following five paragraphs summarize each of the MiniCPS
challenges, with the attacker’s goals and a reference solution:
Network warm up. The goal of the first challenge is to perform
a passive ARP-poisoning MitM attack between PLC2 and PLC3.
The attacker has to perform a network scanning to discover the
hosts addresses and then use ettercap to read the flag on the wire.
Ethernet/IP warm up. The goal of the second challenge is to read
the flag stored in PLC2’s Ethernet/IP server, and addressable with
the name README:2. The attacker has to understand which PLC
owns the README:2 tag, and how to use cpppo, the suggested Eth-
ernet/IP’s Python library [23].
Overflow the Raw water tank. The goal of the third challenge is
to overflow the simulated Raw water tank. The attacker has to un-
derstand the simulated dynamic of a water tank e. g., who drives in-
flow and outflow, and tamper with the correct actuators to increase
the water level above a fixed threshold. Some hints were given
to explain the binary encoding e. g., use m/n to switch ON/OFF a
water pump and OPEN/CLOSE a motorized valve.
Denial of Service HMI. The goal of the fourth challenge is to dis-
rupt the communication (Denial-of-Service) between the HMI and
PLC3, and then change a keep-alive tag value to 3 on PLC3 Eth-
ernet/IP’s server. In normal working condition the keep-alive tag
is periodically set by the HMI to 2. Given the knowledge acquired
from the previous three challenges, the attacker has to perform an
active MitM attack that drops all the packets between the HMI and
PLC3. Notice that, it is not sufficient to just write the required
keep-alive tag value on PLC3 Ethernet/IP’s server.
Overflow the Ultra-filtration tank. The goal of the fifth challenge
is to overflow the Ultrafiltration water tank. The attacker has to
reuse a combination of the previously used techniques to set up an
active MitM attack using custom filtering rules e. g., use ettercap
and etterfilter.
4.3 Trivia Category
The online phase presented six challenges in the Trivia category.
The Trivia challenges were intended for the attackers to understand
the plant structure, behavior, and the defense mechanisms. The
knowledge gained from these challenges is expected to be of use to
the attackers in other phases of the event. In the remainder of this
section, we briefly describe the six challenges, their goals, and the
steps needed to capture the flags.
The trivia challenges can be divided into two types, the first type
involved the knowledge on SWaT, and the second type involved
research papers on SWaT.
Knowledge on SWaT. Three challenges fall under this category.
The goals of these challenges are to focus on the physical process
of SWaT [38], the control strategy of SWaT, and the set points of
the sensors and actuators. Following are the details regarding the
challenges.
Trivia 1 The goal of the first challenge is to identify the analyzer
that is used by the PLCs to control a specific dosing pump. In order
to identify the device, the participant has to understand the control
strategy of the particular dosing pump. As the PLC uses a number
of different inputs to control the dosing pump, the participant has
to trace the signals and identify the particular analyzer.
Trivia 2 The goal of the second challenge is to find out the set
point that triggers the start of the backwash process. During the
filtration process, small particles clot the Ultrafiltration membrane.
To remove them and clean the Ultrafiltration membrane, a back-
wash process is started after reaching a specific threshold. In order
to answer this challenge, the participant needs to revise and under-
stand the backwash process.
Trivia 3 The goal of the third challenge is to identify the set
point of the hardness analyzer used by a PLC to shut down the RO
filtration. The hardness analyzer measures the water hardness in
SWaT. The set point is a desired value of a particular sensor which
is used by the PLC to control the plant. In the current scenario,
when hardware analyzer exceeds desired value, PLC shuts down
the RO filtration. In order to answer this challenge, attacker should
understand the set points and control strategy of the RO process.
Research papers on SWaT. The remaining three challenges fall
under this category. The goals of these challenges are to raise
awareness about ICS attacks techniques and their classification in
the context of SWaT. We selected the following three papers: [1,
2, 21] as reference attack vectors targeting ICS. Following are the
details of those challenges.
Trivia 4 The goal of this challenge is to familiarise the attacker
with possible attacks on SWaT and potential impact of those at-
tacks on SWaT. We provided a research paper [2] that presents an
experimental investigation of cyber attacks on an ICS. In order to
answer the challenge, the participant needed to read the paper and
understand it.
Trivia 5 The goal of this challenge is to familiarise the partic-
ipant with a security analysis of a CPS. We provided another re-
search paper [21] that presented a security analysis of a CPS using
a formal model. In order to answer the challenge attacker should
read the paper and understand it.
Trivia 6 The goal of this challenge is to familiarise the attacker
with multi-point attacks on ICS. We provided a third research pa-
per [1] that discussed multi-point attacks. A multi-point attack
leverages more than one entry point, e.g, two or more communi-
cations links, to disturb the state of an ICS. In order to answer the
challenge, the participant needed to read the paper and understand
it.
4.4 Forensics Category
The forensics challenges focused on network capture files, in
particular pcap files, that are easy to process using programs such
as wireshark and tcpdump. The participant had to learn how to
process and extract information from a file containing pre-recorded
network traffic from an ICS. The target industrial protocol was Eth-
ernet/IP. We now provide details on three of the four challenges.
Identify the ICS hosts. The goal of the first challenge is to perform
an analysis of the ICS hosts inside a captured ICS network traffic.
To achieve that goal, the attacker should search for the hosts inside
the captured traffic, classify them based on their IP addresses, iden-
tify whether a host is inside the ICS network or not and enumerate
them.
Finding the poisoning host. The goal of this challenge is to search
for a host that has performed an ARP poisoning Main-in-the-Middle
attack, inside a captured network traffic. Then, the attacker will
identify the start point and end point of captured ARP poisoning
attack inside the captured network traffic. As an example, the flag
of this problem will be the start and end TCP sequence number in
the form of ascflag{A-B}, where the A is the starting TCP se-
quence number and B is the ending TCP sequence number.
Understanding the CIP protocol structure. The goal of this chal-
lenge is to find a particular pattern inside the payload of CIP mes-
sages. In particular, the attacker has to recognize that a CIP payload
contains encrypted data and then he has to decrypt it. So, the at-
tacker can decrypt the ciphertext by performing a XOR it with a
key included in the payload or performing a brute-force.
4.5 Results from the Online phase
Table 2 presents the final scores of each team, the number of cap-
tured flags, and an estimation of the time spent playing, computed
as the difference between the last and the first flag submitted by a
team. As we can observe from the table, two teams were able to
fully complete all tasks, with Team 6 being by far the most effi-
cient. On average teams spent 25.67 hours to solve the challenges
(53% of the maximum of 48 straight hours), with a standard de-
viation of 13.06 hours. The teams scored an average of 268.83
points (52.7% of the maximum of 510). We believe that both the
time invested and the percentage of challenges solved shows a no-
table investment in the game, and provides evidence on the engage-
ment generated by the gamification strategy. In addition, we note
a correlation between the number of hours invested, and the points
achieved. In fact, when the outlier (Team 6) is removed, there is a
0.97 Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) between time spent and
points achieved.
Table 2: S3 Online Results summary. Category names:
MCPS=MiniCPS, T=Trivia, F=Forensics, P=PLC, M=Misc
Flags per category
Team MCPS T F P M Σ Flags Score Time
Team 1 2 6 4 0 1 13 250 30h
Team 2 5 6 4 3 2 20 510 44h
Team 3 0 4 2 0 1 7 86 27h
Team 4 4 4 2 0 0 10 161 28h
Team 5 0 4 2 0 1 7 66 21h
Team 6 5 6 4 3 2 20 510 4h
To conclude the online event, we believe that the gamification
factor played an important role. Gamification helped us to combine
different categories in an unified ICS security theme, to motivate
the attacker teams to do their best to get the maximum points, and
to implicitly train them for the upcoming live phase.
5. LIVE PHASE OF S3
As discussed in Section 3, the goal of the online phase was to pre-
pare teams for the live phase of S3. In this section we will present
the SWaT Security Showdown live event, and the details about its
setup, and scoring system. Afterwards, we will describe two of
the academic detection mechanisms, ARGUS and HAMIDS, that
were used during the event. We conclude the section providing a
summary of the collected results.
5.1 Live phase Setup
The live phase of S3 was held at SUTD over the course of 2 days
in July 2016. All six attacker teams that participated in the online
phase were invited. Each team was assigned a three hour timeslot,
in which it would have free access to SWaT to test and deploy a
range of attacks, taking advantage of the knowledge gained during
the online phase presented in Section 4. In addition, teams were
able to visit the SWaT testbed for one working day, to perform
passive inspection before the event to prepare themselves.
The main goal of the live phase was two-fold: firstly, the teams
would be able to learn more about an actual ICS and its security
(second and third goals from Section 3.3). Secondly, we would be
able to test a number of (internally developed) detection systems
that were deployed in SWaT to evaluate and compare their perfor-
mances (fourth goal from Section 3.3).
5.2 Scoring and Attacker Profiles
We designed the scoring system for the live phase with the fol-
lowing goals:
• Incentivise more technically challenging attacks.
• De-incentivise re-use of same attack techniques.
• Provide challenges with different difficulty levels.
• Relate the attack techniques to realistic attacker models.
• Minimize damages to the participants and the actual system.
We now briefly summarize the scoring system we devised. In
general, points were only be awarded if the attack result could be
undone by the attacker (to minimize the risks of permanent dam-
ages).
Equation 1 defines how to score an attack attempt:
s = g∗ c∗d ∗ p (1)
With s being the final score, g a value representing the base value
of the goal, c a control modifier to value the level of control the
attacker has, d a detection modifier, and p the attacker profile mod-
ifier. Most modifiers were in the range [1,2], while the base value
for the targets was in the range [100,200].
We now describe in detail the four modifiers from Equation 1.
Goals could be chosen from two sets: physical process goals and
sensor data goals.
Physical Process Goals g. Control over actuators, and physical
process (water treatment):
• 100 points: Motorised Valves (open/close/intermediate).
• 130 points: Water Pumps (on/off).
• 145 points: Pressure.
• 160 points: Tank fill level (true water amount, not sensor
reading).
• 180 points: Chemical dosing.
Sensor Data Goals g. Control over sensor readings at different
components:
• 100 points: Historian values.
• 130 points: HMI/SCADA values.
• 160 points: PLC values.
• 200 points: Remote I/O values.
Control modifiers c. The control modifier determined how precise
control the attacker had. As guideline the modifier was 0.2 if the
attacker could randomly (value and time) influences the process, up
to 1.0 if the attacker could precisely influence the process or sensor
value to a target value chosen by the judges.
Detection modifiers d. Not triggering a detection mechanism while
the attack is executed would increase the detection modifier, using
the following formula: 2− x/6, with x the number of triggered de-
tection mechanisms.
Attacker profile modifiers p. For each attack attempt, the attack-
ing team had to inform the judges about the chosen attacker model
before the attack is started. The overall idea is that a weaker at-
tacker profile would yield a higher multiplier. The attacker profiles
were based on [31] and the higher is the modifier the weaker is
the attacker model. The SWaT Security Showdown live event used
three attacker profiles: the cybercriminal, the insider, and the strong
attacker.
The cybercriminal model had a factor of 2. The cybercriminal
was assumed to have remote control over a machine in the ICS net-
work, and was able to use own or standard tools such as nmap, and
ettercap. The cybercriminal did not have access to ICS specific
tools, such as Studio 5000 (IDE to configure SWaT’s PLCs), or
access to administrator accounts.
The insider attacker had a factor of 1.5. It represented a dis-
gruntled employee with physical access and good knowledge of
the system, but no prior attack experience, and only limited com-
puter science skills. In particular, the attacker was not allowed to
use tools such as nmap or ettercap, but had access to engineering
tools (such as Studio 5000), and administrator accounts.
The strong attacker effectively combined both other attackers,
resulting in the strongest available attacker model, and yielded a
factor of 1.
Attackers could earn points for one or more attacks. If more than
one attack was successfully performed, the highest scores from
each goal was aggregated as final score. For example, if an attack
on pumps was successful both using the strong attacker model, for
a total score s of 130 points, and the cybercriminal attack model,
for a total score s of 200 points, then only 200 points would be
counted for that attack goal (attack a pump).
5.3 Detection mechanisms
As discussed in Section3, as part of the design of our approach
we included academic and commercial detection mechanisms as
means to incentivate the creativity of attackers: the less detection
mechanisms triggered the more points obtained, as discussed in the
previous subsection. Also, the experience was designed to serve
as feedback to the designers of detection mechanisms when con-
fronted with various human attackers and a wider range of attack
possibilities. In the following we emphasise two academic detec-
tion mechanisms implemented at SUTD.
5.3.1 Distributed detection system
The distributed attack detection method presented in [4, 6] was
implemented in Water Treatment Testbed as one of the defense
methods used in the S3 event. The method is based on physical
invariants derived from the CPS design. A “Process invariant,” or
simply invariant, is a mathematical relationship among “physical”
and/or “chemical” properties of the process controlled by the PLCs
in a CPS. Together at a given time instant, a suitable set of such
properties constitute the observable state of SWaT. For example, in
a water treatment plant, such a relationship includes the correlation
between the level of water in a tank and the flow rate of incoming
and outgoing water across this tank. The properties are measured
using sensors during the operation of the CPS and captured by the
PLCs at predetermined time instants. Two types of invariants were
considered: state dependent (SD) and state agnostic (SA). While
both types use states to define relationships that must hold, the SA
invariants are independent of any state based guard while SD in-
variants are. An SD invariant is true when the CPS is in a given
state; an SA invariant is always true.
The invariants serve as checkers of the system state. These are
coded and the code placed inside each PLC used in attack detec-
tion. Note that the checker code is added to the control code that
already exists in each PLC. The PLC executes the code in a cyclic
manner. In each cycle, data from the sensors is obtained, control
actions computed and applied when necessary, and the invariants
checked against the state variables or otherwise. Distributing the
attack detection code among various controllers adds to the scala-
bility of the proposed method. During S3, the implementation was
located inside the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) [4].
5.3.2 The HAMIDS framework
The HAMIDS (HierArchical Monitoring Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem) framework [5] was designed to detect network-based attacks
on Industrial Control Systems. The framework leverages a set of
distributed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) nodes, located at dif-
ferent layers (segments) of an ICS network. The role of those nodes
is to extract detailed information about a network segment, com-
bine the information in a central location, and post-process it for
real-time security analysis and attack detection. Each node uses
the Bro Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [29].
Figure 4 shows our deployment of the HAMIDS framework in-
stance deployed in the SWaT. As we could see from Figure 4, each
L0 (Layer 0) DLR segment has an additional Bro IDS node that
is collecting data flowing from a PLC to the RIO device. An ad-
ditional Bro IDS node is connected to a mirroring port of the L1
(Layer 1) industrial switch, and is collecting the traffic in the L1
star topology. Every Bro IDS node is sending data to the central
HAMIDS host, by means of a secure channel (using SSH). Elas-
ticsearch [16], a distributed, RESTful storage and search engine, is
used to provide a scalable and reliable information recording and
processing.
The HAMIDS detection mechanism is entirely isolated from the
ICS network, and thus as part of the live event, the attackers were
not able to have direct access to the detection system. So the attack-
ers will have hard times trying to stop the detection mechanisms of
the HAMIDS framework. On the other side, there are two ways
to access data from a defender perspective: a Web interface and a
SQL API.
The web interface is a user-friendly interface that can be used by
less technical ICS operators and it is capable of listing all alarms
generated by the central node, and eventually help in detecting an
ongoing attack. The expert user can directly use the SQL API to
query the central node, and obtain more detailed data about the
observed packets.
For the event, the framework was configured to present high-
level information about the status of the detection system, suitable
for non-expert defenders. Using the web user interface, the de-
fender could read the generated alarms related to triggered alarms
due to observed network traffic in the industrial control system.
In addition, expert defenders could read the detailed information
about the ICS process by using manual SQL queries to retrieve data
for further analysis.
5.4 Results from the Live phase
Table 3 shows the final scores, the number of performed attacks
and the cumulative detection rate drate of the live phase. The cu-
mulative detection rate was computed as the average number of de-
tection mechanisms triggered (considering only the two academic
detection mechanisms discussed before) in all successful attacks by
a given team.
In order to show more in depth insights of the live phase, we
now provide details on several attacks that were conducted by the
participants during the SWaT Security Showdown live event (see
Table 4). We classify those attacks in two types, the “cyber” attacks
were conducted over the network using either the cybercriminal, or
the strong attacker model, while the “physical” attacks were con-
ducted having direct access to the SWaT using either the insider, or
the strong attacker model. We now describe each of those attacks.
DoS by SYN flooding. The first attack was a cyber-attack, and the
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Figure 4: The HAMIDS framework instance: Bro IDS nodes
are placed both at L0 and L1 network segments of the SWaT.
Table 3: SWaT Security Showdown Live Results summary.
Team Score Successful Attacks drate
Team 1 666 4 1
Team 2 458 2 1
Team 3 642 3 1
Team 4 104 1 1
Team 5 688 5 65
Team 6 477 3 43
attacker used the insider attacker model. The attacker had access
to the administrator account and associated tools. The attacker per-
formed a SYN flooding attack on PLC1’s Ethernet/IP server. SYN
flooding is a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, where the attacker
(the client) continuously try to establish a TCP connection, sending
a SYN request to the Ethernet/IP server, the Ethernet/IP server then
responds with an ACK packet, however the attacker never com-
pletes the TCP three-way-handshake and continues to send only
SYN packets. As a result of this DoS attack, the HMI’s is unable
to obtain current state values to display, and would display 0 or *
characters instead. Such effects would impede the supervision of
ICS in real applications. However, the attack did not interrupt or
harm the physical process itself. The HAMIDS detectors was able
to detect the attack by observing the high number of SYN requests
without follow-up. The ARGUS detector was not able to detect the
Table 4: Live Attacks and Detections summary:# = undetected,  = detected.
Attack Type Score ARGUS HAMIDS
SYN flooding
(DoS) PLC
Cyber 396 #  
DoS Layer 1
network
Cyber 104 #  
Tank level sensor
tampering
Physical 324   
Chemical dosing
pump
manipulation
Physical 360  #
attack, as the physical process was not impacted.
DoS. The second attack was a cyber-attack, the attacker used the
cybercriminal attacker model. The attacker had access to the net-
work and attack tools. The attacker performed an ARP poisoning
Man-in-the-Middle attack, that redirected all traffic addressed to
the HMI. The redirected traffic was then dropped and prevented
from being received. The attack drove the HMI to an unusable
state, and it took a while to restore the system state after the at-
tack. We did not allow the attack to run long enough to affect the
physical process. HAMIDS detected the attack due to the changes
in network traffic (i.e. malicious ARP traffic, changed mapping be-
tween IP and MAC addresses in IP traffic). In contrast, ARGUS did
not detect the attack, as the physical process continued to operate
without impact.
Tank level sensor tampering. The third highlighted attack in-
volved an on-site interaction with the system, the attacker used the
strong attacker model. The attacker focused on one of the L0 seg-
ments, and he demonstrated control over the packets sent in the
Ethernet ring. Indeed, the attacker was able to alter the L0 traffic in
real time, and manipulate the communication between the PLC and
the RIO. ARGUS was able to detect the attack due to the sudden
changes in reported sensor values (bad data detector). In addition,
the HAMIDS framework detect the attack by observing the change
in data reported from the PLC to the SCADA (and potentially, in
L0 as well).
Chemical dosing pump manipulation. The fourth attack was a
physical-attack, and the attacker used the insider attacker model.
The attacker was able to alter the chemical dosing in the second
stage (Pre-treatment) of the SWaT by interacting directly with the
HMI interface, and overriding the commands sent by the PLC (that
was set in manual mode). The attack would have resulted in an
eventual degradation of the quality of the water, however we stopped
the attack before that case occurred. ARGUS was able to detect
the attack because the updated setpoints diverged from their hard-
coded counterpart in the detection mechanism. The HAMIDS de-
tection was unable to detect this scenario as the network traffic did
not show unusual patterns or changes (as typical for attacks using
the insider model).
6. DISCUSSION OF S3
In the following section we present an analysis of a survey that
we ran after the SWaT Security Showdown, and some lessons learned
during the online and live phases of S3.
6.1 Post-S3 Survey Analysis
After the end of the SWaT Security Showdown event, we dis-
tributed an anonymous survey, both to the attacker and defender
teams. The survey asked targeted questions about the online and
the live phases, and for each question the team has to select a score
from 1 to 5; e. g., 1 corresponded to full disagreement with the pro-
posed question, and 5 to full agreement. We present some insights
from the survey process, that overall resulted in a positive feedback
from the participants and in an interest to participate again in an
security competition targeting ICS, such as S3.
Table 5 shows the statistics of the answers received from the at-
tacker teams. As it can be seen from the table, the overall satis-
faction level is high, however there are two low scores, one regard-
ing the difficulty level of the online event, and the other regard-
ing the information shared beforehand. Most of the teams com-
mented that the time given to prepare the attacks in the live phase
was not enough. Indeed, more time to interact with the system is
ideal and we will considering organizing future events. However
Table 5: SWaT Security Showdown Attacker Survey summary:
apart from *, scores from 1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree).
Question Mean Std Dev
Was the level of difficulty appropriate for
the on-line phase?
3.67 1.52
Was the level of difficulty appropriate for
the live phase?
4 1
Was the scoring appropriate for the on-line
phase?
3.67 0.57
Was the scoring appropriate for the live
phase?
4 1
Were the information shared beforehand
and the on-line phase useful for preparing
the live event?
3.67 1.53
*In your opinion, how much time would
be required to prepare the attacks in the
testbed?
8.67 h 2.31 h
How do you rank your overall experience
in the S3 event?
4.67 0.57
on the one hand, we think that strict time constraints increase the
level of realism of the competition, e. g., an attacker who penetrated
a guarded ICS does not have unlimited time to perform his attack.
On the other hand there are some inherent time and organizational
constraints: it is impossible to parallelize such a competition, to
avoid teams interfering with each other, and holding such an event
with even a restricted number of teams for several days is resource-
consuming (lab engineer and judges must be constantly present).
In particular, we present two constructive feedbacks, one from
an attacker team, and one from a defender team, that we will take
into account in the next SWaT Security Showdown iteration:
• Attacker team: “There were some differences between the
online and offline event, we made assumptions based on what
we did online that ended up being wrong for the offline chal-
lenges. Overall it was a good lessons learnt for next time!”
• Defender team: “I think that the attackers shouldn’t have
access to the HMI even with the insider profile. An insider
should know the process and tags names and even have ac-
cess to the HMI machine, but to perform an attack from the
HMI itself is not only a boring attack that in the same man-
ner the operator can do almost everything he wants, (. . . ) I
think that the usage of the HMI should be only if the hack-
ers manage to hack the HMI software and not from the user
interface.”
Regarding the attacker comment, this is motivated by the fact
that in the simulations used in the live phase there were unavoidable
simplifications of the real system, which might have been mislead-
ing to some participants. In future events we will better highlight
this differences to better prepare teams. The defender comment
is interesting: indeed some defense products are aimed to protect
against malicious external attackers, while trusting plant operators
with administrator privileges. However this highlights the short-
comings of such mechanisms against malicious and powerful in-
siders.
6.2 Online phase: Lessons learned
We have learned a number of useful lessons from the MiniCPS
related challenges, and we will present three of them. Firstly, it
is hard to reproduce (simulate) the Secure Water Treatment: we
were able to provide partial support of the Ethernet/IP protocol,
and replicate only the hydraulic part of the SWaT. Secondly, crash
recovery and management is hard: during the competition we suf-
fered some downtime caused by attackers trying to use (legitimate)
brute-force attack techniques, and because of that some of them
wasted their time waiting for us to restore the system. Indeed, it is
very important to develop a simulation environment that is able to
gracefully shutdown, and restart automatically in most of the cases.
Finally, side channel attacks mitigation is hard. By side channel at-
tack, we mean any attack that uses a different channel from the
ones intended by the competition. Remember that, an attacker had
to find one hole in our simulation environment however we had to
try to cover all of them. Indeed it is important to not overlook the
basic configuration of your system, even the parts not directly re-
lated to the security competition. For example, remove unnecessary
software, and update all your software to the most recent (secure)
version.
We have learned mainly two useful lessons from the Trivia re-
lated challenges. Firstly, it was helpful to present to the attacker
general questions related to the SWaT’s physical process, however
presenting more advanced ones would have helped the attacker in
the live phase to prepare more effective attacks. The same was true
for the presented attack techniques. Given that the majority of the
participants was not from the ICS security domain, we decided to
present only basic attack techniques (already tested on the SWaT),
however after the event we realized that we could have presented
more elaborated ones.
6.3 Live phase: Lessons learned
A key aspect of the live event is the interaction of the participants
with real devices, and with other people in a realistic environment.
Even though an online event is low-cost, scales better with the num-
ber of participants, and presentes less risks in terms of safety, we
learned that a live event is an essential part of a security competi-
tion, and it was crucial to include it in S3, even if it required more
effort and risk management.
Furthermore, we understood how important was to distribute doc-
umentation about the SWaT, and give access to it before SWaT Se-
curity Showdown. During the live event it was easy to spot the
teams who did not read the provided documentation, and those
teams got a lower score because they wasted a lot of time to ac-
quire the basic information about the testbed, such as: number of
devices, network topologies, and PLC programming.
The major lesson that ICS professionals should learn from the
live phase is that ICS security consists of two intertwined parts:
network and physical security. It is important to repeat that the
attacker surface of an ICS is broad, because it results in both cy-
ber and physical attack. Indeed, ICS security professionals should
consider both the cyber and the physical risk at the same time when
dealing with ICS security.
Finally, it is important to notice that designing a CTF is a hard
and time-consuming task. Two key design aspects are the selection
of vulnerabilities and the scoring system. Let’s use a jeopardy-
style CTF as an example. If the challenges are too hard then the
newcomers may lose interest after playing for a while, however, if
the challenges are too easy the participants will not enjoy the com-
petition. Indeed is crucial to design the challenges according to the
audience expertise, and to present novel threats rather than reusing
material from other passed events. The scoring system has to “in-
centivize” good behaviors and “punish” bad behaviors, according
to the CTF rules. However, it is impossible to predict, and stop at-
tackers from finding the novel technique to break the rules, and in
some CTF (like DEFCON) there are no rules at all! In general, a
good scoring system has to be fair, automated and easy to under-
stand, e. g., participants will have to focus on the CTF challenges,
rather than try to find a way to exploit an overcomplicated scoring
system.
7. RELATED WORK
In the following we review some related efforts in gamification
for security education.
There exists several popular CTF competitions, of which one of
the most established ones is DEFCON [12]. This is an annual hack-
ing conference organized by information security enthusiasts. The
DEFCON CTF is part of the main event, and it is one of the most
well known, and competitive CTF events worldwide. DEFCON
CTF has a jeopardy-style qualification phase, and an attack-defense
final phase, indeed its structure is simular to the one of SWaT Se-
curity Showdown, however ICS security is not the main focus of
DEFCON’s CTF. Several other similar CTF competitions are listed
in [13].
In [40] Vigna propose to use gamified live exercises similar to
CTFs to teach network security. The motiviations and philosophy
of this work are similar to ours, however the focus is on traditional
IT and network security (such as gaining root privileges in a web-
server and steal data from an SQL database).
Inspired by [40], in [11] authors of the iCTF event (organized
by an academic instutition) presented two novel, live, and large-
scale security competitions. The first is called “treasure hunt” and
it exercises network mapping and multi-step network attacks. The
second is a “Botnet-inspired” competition and it involves client-
side web security, in particular Web browsers exploitation. Unlike
the presented paper, both competitions focus on traditional client-
server ICT network architectures and attack-only scenario.
The MIT/LL CTF [42] was an attack-defense CTF with a fo-
cus on web application security. The main goal of the event was
to attract more people towards practical computer security, lower-
ing the barriers of a typical CTF that requires an extensive back-
ground. The CTF takes inspiration from Webseclab [9], a web se-
curity teaching Virtual Machine that is packed with an interactive
teaching web application, a sandboxed student development envi-
ronment, and a set of useful programs. Both are interesting projects
but they are not covering the ICS security domain, even though they
share some of the presented goals.
BIBIFI [33] is a cyber-security competition held mainly in aca-
demic environments that adds secure development (Build-it) as a
major component, together with the attack (Break-it) and the patch
(Fix-it) components. This effort was targeted at improving secure
software construction education, and thus the exercises proposed in
this competition do not cover the ICS security domain.
In [27] Mink presents an empirical study that evaluates how ex-
ercises based on gamification and offensive security approaches in-
crease both, the motivation and the final knowledge of the partici-
pants. Our work tries to extend this message to ICS security, while
the paper focuses on traditional Information security.
In sum, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to orga-
nize an academic CTF style event on a realistic ICS testbed aimed
at improving ICS security training in academic and industrial envi-
ronments.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we discussed problems faced by security experts
and ICS engineers. In particular, security experts require easy plat-
forms to learn about ICS in general, and practise applied attacks
and defenses. In addition, ICS engineers often require additional
training in offensive and defensive security techniques. We pro-
posed to use gamified events such as online and live challenges to
mitigate those problems. We presented the design and implemen-
tation of two events (online and live) that were conducted together
by us in 2016, leveraging a realistic ICS plant. To our best knowl-
edge, this event was the first attempt to gamify security education,
using both live and virtual ICS testbeds. Overall, the six partici-
pating teams submitted 77 correct flags in the online phase of the
S3 event. In the live phase, the participating teams performed 18
successful attacks, of which most were detected by at least one of
our detection mechanisms. We provide a summary of challenges
for both events, and the achieved solutions by the participants, de-
scribe some of the design choices made, e.g., relating to attacker
profiles, goals and scoring for the live event. The presented work
should provide a foundation to enable others to run similar events
in the future.
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